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MOTOR VEHICLE LESSORS’ LIABILITY FOR 
DAMAGES TO THIRD PARTIES: A COMMENT 
Abrar Sabir v W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC 
   
Hailegabriel G. Feyissa ♣ 
Introduction  
Amidst deteriorating road safety and increased motor vehicle accidents, 
litigations involving Article 2081 et seq. of the Ethiopian Civil Code appear to 
have increased in the last few years. Interesting court decisions involving, 
among other things, the scope of the strict liability rules of the Ethiopian extra-
contractual liability law, are now coming into sight. While the black letters of 
the law are not necessarily clear on the specific scope of Article 2081 et seq. of 
the Civil Code, courts1 and academics2 have been reflecting on the tricky subject 
of defining the scope of application of the Ethiopian law on liability for 
damages caused by motor vehicles. 
In entertaining issues related to Article 2081, the Cassation Division of the 
Federal Supreme Court in a recent case has rendered a decision that allows 
                                           
♣ LLB (Bahir Dar University), LLM (University of Groningen), PhD Student (The 
University of Melbourne). Formerly, the author was assistant professor of law at Law 
School, Bahir Dar University.  
1 E.g., Negist Makonnen et al. v Ethiopian Airlines et al., Addis Ababa High Court Civil 
Case No. 701/55 E.C.  
2 See, e.g.,Krzeczunowicz, G. (1970) The Ethiopian Law of Extra-Contractual 
Liability. Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie I University, p.166 [hereinafter 
Krzeczunowicz];  Krzeczunowicz, G. (1977)The Ethiopian Law of Compensation for 
Damage. Addis Ababa, Commercial Printing Enterprise, pp. 170 and 238 [hereinafter 
Krzeczunowicz on Compensation]; ንጋቱ ተስፋዬ (1996 ዓ.ም.)፣ ከውል ውጭ ኃላፊነትና Aላግባብ 
መበልፀግ ሕግ፣ Aዲስ Aበባ፣ Aርቲስቲክ ማተሚያ ድርጅት፣ pp.107-108 [hereinafter  ንጋቱ]. Also, for a 
recent reflection on the scope of Article 2081 of the Ethiopian Civil Code see 
HailegabrielF. (2011) “The Scope of Article 2081 of the Civil Code: A Comment on 
Negist Makonnen et al v. Ethiopian Airlines, Inc.”Bahir Dar University Journal of 
Law, 2(1), pp.153-158 (Also indexed in Public International Law eJournal, Vol. 7, 
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owners of leased motor vehicle to escape strict liability (i.e. liability without 
fault) under certain circumstances. Taken aback by the Cassation Bench’s 
decision relieving the owner of motor vehicle from liability, I would in this short 
comment explain why the Bench got it wrong and how the precedent (for 
binding interpretation) it set would incorrectly limit the right of the injured to 
hold the lessor responsible.  
1. Summary of the Case 
Abrar Sabir v W/roAlemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC 3 
On 25 Tikimit 1996 E.C. (November 5, 2003), a Hilux Toyota, carrying Ato 
Abraham Aklil, collided with a tree near Sherera Kebele. Ato Abraham, who 
was seriously injured in the accident, died on 03 Tahsas 1996 (December 13, 
2003) despite some medical care. W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene, his widow, sued 
Ato Abrar Sabir, the owner of the motor vehicle for damages. 
Before the High Court of Arsi Zone – the court that initially entertained the 
case – the defendant argued that he should not incur extra-contractual liability 
for the motor vehicle was leased to Tibebu Construction PLC.4 Nonetheless, the 
court held the lessor of the vehicle liable. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Oromia National Regional State affirmed the decision of the lower court as 
regards liability, even if it reduced the amount of compensation awarded to the 
claimant.5 The Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia dismissed Ato Abrar’s appeal 
for it agreed with the judgment appealed from. Finally, Ato Abrar submitted a 
cassation petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court for 
review of the judgment rendered by the lower courts on grounds of fundamental 
error of law. The highest judicial authority, unlike the lower courts, agreed with 
the petitioner that the lessee (Tibebu Construction PLC) would be liable 
notwithstanding the fact that the driver of the leased car is employed by the 
lessor under the lease agreement. Quoting6 from the opinion: 
Save where damage is caused while the vehicle is stolen, the owner of motor 
vehicle is liable under Article 2081 of the Civil Code for damage caused by it 
irrespective of the fact that the damage is caused by a person who is not 
authorized to operate or drive the vehicle. Yet, a holder is also liable for 
                                           
3 Abrar Sabir v W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC, Federal 
Supreme Court of Ethiopia, Cassation File No.55228 [January, 2011; reported in የሰበር 
ውሳኔዎች፣ ቅፅ 11፣ 2003 ዓ. ም፣ ገፅ  416-419] 
4 Upon the request of Ato Abrar Sabir, the lessee was later joined as defendant in the 
suit as per Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Code.  
5 While W/ro Alemtsehay claimed 138,400.00 birr in damages, the High Court of Arsi 
Zone awarded her only Birr 40,000.00. The Supreme Court of Oromia National 
Regional State further reduced this sum to Birr 25,000.00.  
6 Translation by the author. 
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damages caused by the vehicle in his holding. Accordingly, the owner and 
holder of the vehicle are jointly and severally liable. Moreover, the owner is 
entitled under Article 2083 of the Civil Code to be indemnified by the holder 
if the former alone has paid compensation to the victim. The petitioner was 
sued because he was the owner of the vehicle causing the accident. Upon the 
petitioner’s request, the second respondent was joined as defendant during 
the trial for it was the lessee of the vehicle during the accident. Though the 
driver of the rented car was employed by the owner, Article 2082 of the Civil 
Code does not relieve the holder [lessee] from liability for the mere reason 
that the driver is accountable to the lessor. The holder is thus liable for the 
law places ultimate liability on him. The decision of the lower courts that 
relieved the lessee from liability and held the appellant (lessor) solely liable 
for the damage was not in accord with the content and spirit of the provisions 
of Articles 2081, 2082(1) and 2083 of the Civil Code; and hence involves 
fundamental error of law.7 
In light of the above reasoning, the court ordered the lessee of the motor vehicle 
to redress the damage W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene sustained.  
2. Applicable Law 
Abrar Sabir v W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC involves 
the interpretation of Articles 2081-2083 of the Ethiopian Civil Code. As the 
                                           
7 The Amharic version of the excerpts reads as follows:  
  “በፍትሐብሔር ሕግ ቁጥር 2081(1) መሠረት የAንድ መኪና ወይም ባለሞተር ተሽከርካሪ ባለቤት ... 
ንብረቱ ተሰርቆ በነበረበት ጊዜ ለደረሰው Aደጋ ከተጠያቂነት ነፃ ከሚሆን በስተቀር መኪናውን ወይም 
ባለሞተር ተሽከርካሪውን ለመንዳት ባልተፈቀደለት ሰው Eንኳን ተነድቶ ጉዳት Aድርሶ ቢገኝ የመኪናው 
ወይም የባለሞተር ተሽከርካሪው ባለቤት ከውል ውጭ በሚደርሱ ኃላፊነቶች ውስጥ በፍትሐብሔር ሕጉ 
Aጥፊ ሳይሆን ኃላፊ ከሚባሉት ምድቦች ውስጥ የሚመደብ በመሆኑ መኪናው ወይም ባለሞተር 
ተሽከርካሪው ላደረሰው ጉዳት ባለቤቱ ኃላፊ ነው፡፡ ይህ ማለት ግን ስሙ በባለቤትነት ያልተመዘገበ 
መኪናውን ወይም ባለሞተር ተሸከርካሪውን ለግል ጥቅሙ ሲገለገልበትና ሲጠቀምበት የነበረ ሰው መኪናው 
ወይም ባለሞተር ተሸከርካሪው በEጁ በነበረበት ጊዜ ለደረሰው ጉዳት ከተጠያቂነት ነፃ ይሆናል ማለት 
Aለመሆኑን ከፍ/ሕ/ቁጥር 2082(1) ለመረዳት ይቻላል፡፡ በዚህ መነሻነት በAንድ መኪና ወይም ባለሞተር 
ተሸከርካሪ ጉዳት የደረሰበት ሰው የመኪናውን ወይም የባለሞተር ተሸከርካሪውን ባለቤት ወይም በንብረቱ 
ተገልጋይ የነበረውን ማንኛውም ሰው በAንድነትም ሆነ በነጠላ ከሶ ለደረሰበት ጉዳት ካሳ ለመጠየቅ 
በፍትሐብሔር ሕግ ቁጥር 2081(1) Eና 2082(1) መሠረት መብት ያለውን ያህል የመኪናው ወይም 
የባለሞተር ተሽከርካሪው ባለቤት ተብሎ የሚታወቀው ሰው የንብረቱ ባለቤት በመሆኑ ብቻ ተበዳይን ተገዶ 
ከካሰ በኋላ መኪናውን በEጁ Aድርጎ ሲገለገል የነበረውን ማንኛውም ሰው የከፈለውን ገንዘብ Eንዲከፍለው 
የመጠየቅ መብት ያለው መሆኑ በፍትሐብሔር ሕግ ቁጥር 2083(1) ተመልክቷል፡፡ ... Aመልካች በሥር 
ፍ/ቤቶች የተከሰሱት የመኪናው ባለንብረት በመሆናቸው ሲሆን 2ኛ ተጠሪ ወደ ክሱ Eንዲገቡ የተደረገውም 
መኪናውን ጉዳቱ በደረሰበት ጊዜ ሲገለገልበት ነበር በሚል ምክንያት ሁኖ ይኸው ስለመሆኑም በሚገባ 
ተረጋግጧል፡፡ 2ኛ ተጠሪ መኪናውን ሲገለገልበት የነበረ መሆኑ ከታወቀ የመኪናው Aሽከርካሪ በባለንብረቱ 
መቀጠሩ መታወቁ መኪናውን ሲገለገልበት የነበረን ሰው ከኃላፊነት ነፃ ሊያደርገው የሚችል ሕጋዊ 
ምክንያት ስለመሆኑ የፍ/ብ/ሕ/ቁጥር 2082 ድንጋጌ በመስፈርትነት ያላስቀመጠው ነጥብ ነው፡፡ በመሆኑም 
ጉዳቱን ያደረሰውን መኪና ሲገለገልበት የነበረው 2ኛ ተጠሪ መሆኑ ከተረጋገጠ የመጨረሻ ኃላፊነት 
(ultimate liability) ሊወስድ የሚገባው ይኸው ተጠሪ ነው፡፡ በመሆኑም የበታች ፍርድ ቤቶች Aመልካችን 
ለክሱ ኃላፊ፤ 2ኛ ተጠሪን ከክሱ ነፃ በማድረግ ውሳኔ መስጠታቸው ከፍ/ብ/ሕ/ቁጥር 2081፣ 2082(1) Eና 
2083 ድንጋጌዎች ይዘትና መንፈስ ውጭ በመሆኑ መሠረታዊ የሆነ የሕግ ስህተት ሁኖ Aግኝተናል፡፡” 
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lessor and lessee of the motor vehicle involved in an accident are joined as 
defendants, it also calls for the application of Article 43 of the Civil Procedure 
Code.  
While Article 2081 sets the principle that an owner of a motor vehicle is 
strictly liable for any damage caused by the vehicle, Article 2082 places similar 
liability on holders8 of the motor vehicle. Article 20839 deals with transfer of 
liability, and states that the owner who has paid compensation to the victim may 
recover from the holder.  
An understanding of “holder” requires a look at the provisions of Article 
2072 of the Civil Code. Anyone who receives a vehicle for personal benefit is a 
holder. In particular, a person who has taken a rental car or borrowed the vehicle 
is liable for any damage caused by the vehicle in his holding. According to 
Krzeczunowicz, holder under Ethiopian law is different from custodian under 
French law.10 Hence, “the French requirement of ‘controlling’ powers” in the 
determination of whether the custodian is liable is irrelevant.11 
3. Comments 
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench’s decision in Abrar Sabir v W/ro 
Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC (1) involves joinder of a lessor 
and a lessee of a motor vehicle as defendants in a strict liability suit, and (2) 
distinguishes “holder” from “custodian.” In this section, I argue that the decision 
of the court to allow joinder of the lessee as defendant and to finally place sole 
responsibility on the lessee is wrong. Moreover, the court’s rejection of the 
lower courts’ reasoning that “the fact that the motor vehicle involved in the 
accident was being driven by an employee of the lessor should entail strict 
liability of the lessor” can be challenged.  
 
                                           
8 The caption of Article 2082, i.e., keeper or agent, is translated to mean holder or 
employee by George Krzeczunowicz. Here, we use the term holder as opposed to 
keeper to refer to the lessee of motor vehicle. See,Krzeczunowicz, supra note 2, p. 
168.  
9 In particular, the authoritative Amharic version of Article 2083(1) reads: “የመኪናው 
[ወይም] የባለሞተር ተሽከርካሪው ባለቤት ተበዳዩን ተገዶ ከካሰ በኋላ ጠባቂ የነበረውን ሰው በኪሳራ Aከፋፈል 
ሊጠይቀው ይችላል፡፡” 
10 Krzeczunowicz, supra note 2, p. 43. 
11 But see NegistMakonnen et al. v Ethiopian Airlines et al., supra note 1, where the 
court emphasised the importance of control in determining the liable person for 
damages caused by airplane accident.For more on the strict liability of the custodian 
under French law, see, e.g. Wagner G., “Custodian Liability in European Private 
Law”, in Oxford Handbook of European Private Law (Basedow, Hopt, Zimmermann 
eds., Oxford University Press forthcoming).  
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3.1  Whether Third Party Practice Exonerates Joint and Several   
 Liability 
Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Code allows joinder of a third party defendant 
“where the defendant ‘claims to be entitled to contribution or indemnity’ from 
that person”.12 This principle aims at “prompt dispatch of litigation” through the 
management of different but related cases together.13Accordingly, a defendant’s 
claim for contribution or indemnity against the third party is entertained in a 
single suit together with the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant.  
Apparently, the effect of joinder of a third party defendant under Article 
43(1) does not seem to affect the claims of the plaintiff against the original 
defendant. While Article 43(3) simply states “the claim as between the 
defendant and the third party shall be tried in such manner as the court shall 
direct,” the law is not clear whether the plaintiff may make any claim against the 
third party or vice versa. In light of the jurisprudence in common law 
jurisdictions, Robert Sedler opines that courts should “not adjudicate any claim 
between the plaintiff and the third party defendant.”14 Crucially, he posits 
joinder of a defendant under Article 43 does not ipso jure free the original 
defendant from liability whatsoever: 
[T]he claim of the defendant against the third party defendant does not affect 
the plaintiff’s claim at all, and there is no provision authorising the third 
party defendant to make any claim against the plaintiff. The court merely 
adjudicates the question of indemnity or contribution between the defendant 
and the third party defendant, and the third party defendant may assert any 
defences he has against the defendant. If the defendant is found to be entitled 
to contribution or indemnity against the third party defendant, a decree will 
be entered in his favour. The decree imposes an obligation against the third 
party defendant to the defendant, but no obligation [is imposed] against him 
in favour of the plaintiff. If the third party defendant refuses to pay the 
plaintiff directly, the plaintiff will proceed against the defendant, and the 
defendant cannot object on the ground that a decree was entered in his favour 
against the third party defendant. By the same token, the plaintiff is not 
entitled to enforce his decree against the third party defendant”.15 
In Abrar Sabir v W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC, the 
Cassation Bench allowed the lessor – the original defendant – to be relieved 
                                           
12 Sedler, R., (1968) Ethiopian Civil Procedure. Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie I 
University Press, p.87 [Hereinafter Sedler] 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, p.92. 
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from liability notwithstanding the fact that he was jointly and severally16 liable 
with the lessee, i.e., the third party defendant. In placing sole responsibility on 
the lessee, the Bench rendered a decree that imposes an obligation against the 
third party defendant to the plaintiff. The Bench re-affirmed its position in 
another recent case, Nile Insurance SC v. Ato Agegnehu Geremew, et al. 17 in 
which it held that “ሦስተኛ ወገን ጣልቃገብ በክርክር ሂደቱ መሟገት የሚችለው ከተከሣሽ ጋር 
ብቻ ነው ለማለት Aይቻልም” (“the litigation of third party defendant –intervenor- is 
not only against the defendant”). This defies Sedler and comparable 
jurisprudence on third party practice elsewhere. 
The implication of this line of interpretation of Article 43 of the Civil 
Procedure Code is also far reaching. It does not only result in a decree that 
imposes an obligation against the third party defendant to the plaintiff; it may 
also unfairly jeopardise the claims of the plaintiff against the original defendant 
in the suit. The supreme judicial authority in Ethiopia has not given due 
attention to the qualification under Article 43 that any interpretation of the rule 
on third party practice should be undertaken in a manner that does not 
“prejudice the plaintiff against any defendant in the suit”.18 
In Abrar Sabir v W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC the 
Bench did not apparently bother if its interpretation of a procedural rule may 
affect a substantive right of the plaintiff. As rightly pointed out by Sedler,19 
Ethiopian substantive law (not procedural law) governs whether a defendant 
(who requests for a joinder of a third party defendant under Article 43 of the 
Civil Procedure Code) is entitled to contribution or indemnity. And, Ato Abrar’s 
application for the joinder of Tibebu Construction PLC as a co-defendant in a 
strict liability suit must be scrutinized in light of Articles 2083 and 2155 of the 
Civil Code.  
While Article 2155 of the Civil Code underscores that an owner and a holder 
(for our purpose, lessor and lessee) are jointly and severally liable,20 the rules in 
Article 2083 entitle the owner who has paid compensation to the victim to be 
indemnified by the holder. The owner may be indemnified in full except where 
                                           
16 According to Krzeczunowicz, this distinguishes the Ethiopian law from its French 
counterpart where the liability of the holder is alternative to the owner; see 
Krzeczunowicz, supra  note 2, pp.43-44.  
17 Nile Insurance SC v Ato Agegnehu Geremew, et al, Federal Supreme Court, Cassation 
File No. 79465 (Tir 14, 2005 Ethiopian Calendar, forthcoming in የሰበር ውሳኔዎች፣ ቅፅ 
14፣ 2005 ዓ. ም) 
18 This writer believes the rule in sub article 4 of Article 43 regarding a claim (for 
contribution or indemnity) by a defendant against any co-defendant applies whether 
or not the co-defendant is already a party.  
19 Sedler, supra note 11, p. 88.  
20 On the relevance of Article 2155 for cases involving strict liability for damages 
caused by motor vehicle accidents, see Krzeczunowicz, supra note 2, pp.43-44.   
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he or a person for whom he is vicariously responsible is at fault. The literal 
interpretation of Article 2083 implies that a motor vehicle owner may avail 
himself of his right to indemnity only when he has first paid the damage to the 
victim.21 Moreover, the principle of joint and several liability does not allow a 
lessor (owner) of motor vehicle to simply shy away from liability for the mere 
reason that somebody has leased the vehicle. It is against this backdrop of 
substantive rules that I maintain that the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court should have entered a decree in favour of W/ro Alemtsehay 
against Ato Abrar.22 The procedural rule for third party practice is not created 
for the purpose of allowing a defendant who is liable to avoid joint and several 
liability; it is rather created for the purpose of achieving efficiency in civil 
litigation.  
3.2  Lessee’s  Liabilitay Notwithstanding Driver Employed by   
 Lessor 
The reasoning of Oromia courts states that “መኪናው ጉዳቱን ባደረሰበት ጊዜ ይሽከረከር 
የነበረው በተሽከርካሪው ባለንብረት በተቀጠረ ሹፌር በመሆኑ መኪናውን የመቆጣጠር ኃላፊነት 
የሹፌሩ ነው።” (As the vehicle was being driven by an employee of the lessor 
during the infliction of harm, it was the driver who was in control of the 
vehicle). In trying to link possession with responsibility, Oromia courts ignored 
the apparent uniqueness of Ethiopian law on holder’s liability. They interpreted 
motor vehicle holder to mean anyone who controls and directs the vehicle and 
for that reason assumes extra-contractual responsibility.  
This line of interpretation contradicts the presumed intention of the legislator. 
According to Krzeczunowicz, Ethiopia’s conception of holder is different from 
that of custodian under numerous French-inspired European tort laws. In France 
and some other European jurisdictions, strict liability is placed on custodian – 
                                           
21 However, this would make the procedural rule under Article 43 “ineffective”. For 
more on the inconsistency between Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Code and the 
Civil Code rules on contribution and indemnity, see Sedler, supra note 11, pp. 88-89.    
22 Even when one holds that a decree must be entered against a third party defendant 
(the lessee in our case), it must still maintain a decree against the original defendant. I 
am not that much orthodox on Sedler’s idea that the defendant’s claim against the 
third party defendant is treated as if it were a separate claim. I am primarily 
concerned by the ruling of the bench that a claimant in a motor vehicle accident suit 
should be compensated just by one of the two co-defendants, not by both of them as 
the rule on jointly and severally dictates. Note however that I am not against part of 
the bench’s reasoning that goes “ጉዳቱን ያደረሰውን መኪና ሲገለገልበት የነበረው 2ኛ ተጠሪ መሆኑ 
ከተረጋገጠ የመጨረሻ ኃላፊነት (ultimate liability) ሊወስድ የሚገባው ይኸው ተጠሪ ነው፡፡”. This part 
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someone who controls and directs the motor vehicle. Depending on the facts of 
the case, a lessor or a lessee would be a custodian for strict liability purposes. In 
contrast, Ethiopian law places strict liability on the holder – someone who takes 
hold of a rented car, borrows, or receives a vehicle from the owner for his own 
benefit. The law does not require tort claimants to establish “controlling power” 
to establish the strict liability of the holder. What the law requires is the 
establishment of some economic or alternatively juridical elements enumerated 
under Article 2072 of the Civil Code. 
In view of the foregoing, the Federal Supreme Court’s Cassation Bench is 
apparently right to ignore the reasoning of the lower courts that strict liability 
for motor vehicle accidents presupposes control or direction. As the literal 
reading of the law dictates, the lessee remains responsible for third party 
damages irrespective of the fact that actual control of the vehicle belongs to the 
lessor or its agent.  
Equating “holder” to “lessee” of any sort is also problematic. First, the 
provisions of Article 2081 of the Civil Code generally apply to motor vehicles 
including vessels and aircrafts.23 Motor vehicle rentals –which are not adequately 
regulated under the Civil Code – place importance on “control” for the purpose 
of third party liability. As I have argued elsewhere,24 the type of lease contract 
may matter in the distribution of responsibility [for accidents involving the 
leased vehicle] among the lessor and lessee. For instance, a standard long-term 
car rental contract between Chinese construction companies and Ethiopian 
lessors usually include stipulations to the effect that the lessor shall be 
responsible for insurance relating to the car and the driver and all kinds of 
accidents involving the vehicle.25 Moreover, within the context of maritime and 
air law, the relationship between the lessor and the lessee is mainly governed by 
a “highly standardized and negotiated” contract of lease which is often sensitive 
to the issue “who controls the ship or the aircraft” so that responsibility for 
accidents be dealt with fairly.26 
In line with the tradition of distinguishing various types of vehicle lease 
contracts for the purpose of liability, an Ethiopian court rendered a decision27 
that merits acclaim for its analytic rigor. Apart from expressly recognizing the 
application of Article 2081 et seq. of the Civil Code to aerial motor vehicles, it 
                                           
23 For more on this, see Hailegabriel, supra note 2, pp. 153-158. 
24 Hailegabriel F. (2011), “A Legal Appraisal of the Liability of the Actual Air Carrier 
under Ethiopian Law” Bahir Dar University Journal of Law, 2 (1), pp. 85-101 
[hereinafter Hailegabriel on Actual Air Carrier].  
25 Hunan Huanda Road & Bridge Corporation, Dansha-Dejena-AdiRemet Road Project 
Office, Ethiopia, Equipment Rental Contract, on file with the author. 
26 For more on this, Hailegabriel on Actual Air Carrier, supra note 23, pp.94-97 and the 
accompanying footnotes.  
27  See Negist Makonnen et al. v Ethiopian Airlines et al., supra note 1. 
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emphasized the importance of “control” in establishing who between the lessor 
and the lessee is liable for damages to third party. The application of the 
reasoning of the court (in Negist Makonnen et al. v Ethiopian Airlines et al.) to 
our present case would render Ato Abrar Sabir liable because the driver was 
employed by him. As seen above, however, the Ethiopian law does not 
necessarily require “control” for the purpose of establishing the liability of 
motor vehicle owners/lessors. All it requires is the establishment of the 
economic or juridical elements listed in Article 2072 of the Civil Code.  
The writer is of the opinion that “control” may still be important. Crucially, 
when (1) the contract of lease places responsibility for damages on the party 
who controls the vehicle, and (2) the motor vehicles involved are aircrafts and 
vessels, courts should look into who controls the vehicle before identifying the 
party responsible for damages caused by motor vehicle accidents.  
Although literal interpretation of Article 2072 renders the lessee liable, the 
Code’s indifference to the various types of motor vehicle lease agreements 
dissuades us from interpreting the term “hire” broadly. A very careful 
interpretation of “hire” is particularly important vis-à-vis aircraft and vessel 
lease agreements with respect to which there is a long established tradition of 
leaving matters related to liability for accidents to the parties themselves. 
Moreover, legislation and jurisprudence28 recognize the importance of 
differentiating between various types of lease contracts so as not to unduly 
surprise an unsuspecting lessee or lessor who relies on the principle of freedom 
of contract in solving such matters.  
Conclusion  
The interpretation of Article 2081 by the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court matters not only because it uncovers the scope of a very 
important statutory rule whose confines are not clear, but also because literal 
interpretation ends up defeating legitimate expectations of the parties involved 
in motor vehicle lease agreements. The holding of the court in Abrar Sabir v 
W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC also appears far-reaching 
as part of the reasoning, as stated earlier, is sustained in another case –Nile 
Insurance SC v Ato Agegnehu Geremew, et al.  
The writer maintains that the Cassation Bench’s reasoning in Abrar Sabir v 
W/ro Alemtsehay Wesene & Tibebu Construction PLC is problematic for it 
                                           
28 For a comparative overview of the law and jurisprudence on the liability for motor 
vehicle accidents, see Stone, F. (1970) “Liability for Damage Caused by Things”, in 
Tunc, A. et al. (eds.) The International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. The 
Hague, MartinusNijhoff Publishers, Vol. XI, Chapter 5; see also Weir, T. (1983) 
“Complex Liabilities”, in The International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. The 
Hague, MartinusNijhoff Publishers, Vol. XI Torts, Chapter 12.  
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allowed a procedural rule to override a substantive right. Admittedly, the 
interpretation of a procedural rule of Anglo-Indian origin in light of a 
substantive doctrine of continental origin is not easy. Yet, it is my contention 
that the procedural rule for third party practice should not be interpreted in a 
manner that allows a lessor to escape joint and several liability and leave a 
claimant with lesser chances of redress than the substantive law affords her.  
Moreover, the court’s reasoning that the lessee is solely liable for accidents 
caused by the leased motor vehicle is indifferent to the practice in the lease 
industry that differentiates various types of motor vehicle lease agreements. 
Although the court may be right in ignoring the importance of “control” for the 
purpose of identifying the holder under Article 2082, a literal interpretation 
appears to defeat the legitimate expectation of parties to motor vehicle lease 
agreements who usually stipulate contractual provisions regarding liability for 
accidents caused by the leased vehicle.                                                                ■ 




          
 
  
